In Maryland, as elsewhere, the plain meaning rule does not permit extrinsic evidence to contradict what is expressed in the clear language of the will. The plain meaning rule does not, nor did it ever, preclude extrinsic evidence that explains or supports the language contained in the will as long as it does not contradict it. Thus extrinsic evidence is permitted to explain what is meant by the language in the will:
“If the intention cannot be clearly made out from the language of the will, taken in its usual and proper acceptation, then the peculiar situation of the testator and the relations subsisting between him and the objects of his bounty at the time of making his will may be considered in conjunction with the language of the will, and it will be interpreted, with the aid of the light thus thrown upon it, in accordance with the accepted canons of construction. The court will put itself in the testator’s place; in his armchair; will see the circumstances that he saw; appreciate his surroundings as he appreciated them; and then give to the language he has used in his will the meaning which their circumstances and these surroundings indicate he intended the language to have. The court will thus with more accuracy interpret the words of the testator, and gather what he meant to say from what he did say, as viewed from the standpoint he then occupied.”[1]
Accordingly, extrinsic evidence setting forth the surrounding circumstance of the testator/testatrix is always permitted so that the court may understand the situation that the testator/testatrix was in at the time the will was made. Reedy v. Barber, 253 Md. 141, 148 (1969)(citing Philip Louis Sykes, “Probate Law and Practice,” Vol. 1, § 51 (1956)); Marty v. First Nat. Bank of Balt., 209 Md. 210, 217 (1956); Hebden v. Keim, 196 Md. 45, 50 (1950); Chism v. Reese, 190 Md. 311 (1948); Jones v. Holloway, 183 Md. 40, 42-43 (1944); Robinson v. Mercantile Trust Co., 180 Md. 336, 339 (1942); Hutton v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 133 A. 308, 313 (Md. 1926); West v. Sellmayer, 133 A. 333, 334 (Md. 1926).
Extrinsic evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the testator is always admissible, regardless of whether there is a patent or latent ambiguity in the document. Farmer v. Quinn, 105 A. 763, 765 (Md. 1919)(“The rule excluding extrinsic evidence as to a testator’s intention does not prevent the admission of such evidence for the purpose of determining the object of the testator’s bounty, or the subject of disposition, or the quantity of interest intended to be given by his will.)(citing Walston’s Lessee v. White, 5 Md. 297, 305 (1853)); Shipley v. Mercantile Trust Co., 62 Md. 814, 817 (1906); Scarlett v. Montell, 51 A. 1051, 1053 (Md. 1902); Littig v. Hance, 32 A. 343, 344 (Md. 1895); Frick v. Frick, 82 Md. 218 (1895) (“Where the language of the testator is plain and unambiguous, such language must govern and therefore extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to show that he meant something different from what his language imports; but any evidence is admissible which, in its nature and effect, simply explains what the testator has written.”)(citing Walston’s Lessee v. White, 5 Md. 297, 304 (1853)). See also R.T. Kimbrough, Annotation, “Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence to Aid Interpretation of Will,” 94 A.L.R. 26, 57-58 (1935) (stating that surrounding circumstance evidence is admissible for even explaining a patent ambiguity).
Edgar G. Miller, the author of the authoritative Maryland treatise on will construction, outlines the surrounding circumstances exception in §§ 12 and 44 of his book, “The Construction of Wills in Maryland” (1919). Section 44 is titled “Evidence of Facts and Circumstances” and reads:
“For the purpose of determining the object of a testator’s bounty, or the subject of disposition, or the quantity of interest intended to be given by his will, a court may inquire into every material fact relating to the person who claims to be interested under the will, and to the property which is claimed as the subject of disposition, and to the circumstances of the testator, and of his family and affairs, for the purpose of enabling the court to identify the person or thing intended by the testator, or to determine the quantity of interest he has given by his will. All the facts and circumstances respecting persons and property to which the will relates are legitimate, and often necessary, evidence to enable the court to understand the meaning and application of the words of the testator. The court may put itself in the place of the testator by looking into the state of his property and the circumstances by which he was surrounded at the time of making his will; but this is done only to explain ambiguities arising out of extrinsic circumstances and not to show a different intention from that which the will discloses. Any evidence is admissible which in its nature and effect simply explains what the testator has written, that is, which explains the meaning of the words, or applies the language of the will to the subject matter. Thus where the question was as to what the testator meant when he wrote in his will the word “advances,” it was proper to offer facts which would establish the actual state of circumstances that existed when the will was made, so that the court might put itself in the place of the testator and from that standpoint judge of his intentions. And in another case extrinsic evidence was considered in order to ascertain what the testator meant by the expression ‘the balance of my estate.’ Other cases are stated in the note.”[2] (emphasis added).
Thus, the surrounding circumstances exception to the plain meaning rule pays tribute to the importance of context. The exception allows the document and specific words from it to be understood as the testator understood them – against the backdrop of his or her occupation, property holdings, and relationships with family and others. Darden v. Bright, 173 Md. 563, 568 (1938); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, § 10.2 cmt. d. See also Marty v. First Nat’l Bank of Balt., 209 Md. 210, 221-22 (1956)(Reviewing evidence of the administration of mother’s estate where early vesting of property rights caused adverse tax consequences to determine that testator intended the property to vest late rather than early to avoid the same result.); Hebden v. Keim, 196 Md. 45, 49 (1950)(Reviewing ages of testatrix and brother and clauses from brother’s will to infer animosity in the relationship and to determine that testatrix intended to direct $8,000 under the residuary clause rather than to distribute it as a specific bequest to her brother’s estate.); Farmer v. Quinn, 105 A. 763, 765-66 (Md. 1919) (Allowing evidence of the value of goods to determine testator’s intent when he used the term “present invoice price.”); Frick v. Frick, 82 Md. 218 (1895) (Reviewing evidence of second marriage and sale of farm two months after execution of the will to determine that the testator did not intend to include the farm promissory note in a bequest of personal property.); Kloch v. Burger, 58 Md. 575, 578 (1882)(Reviewing evidence of testator’s business practices to determine that the testator did not intend to bequeath fifty barrels of whiskey under the clause “my stock of medicines, drugs, etc.”); Warner v. Miltenberger, 21 Md. 264, 273-74 (1864)(Allowing jury to review evidence to determine whether testator intended the term “lot” to apply to a subdivision on a plat or a large parcel of land.); Willett v. Carroll, 13 Md. 459, 468 (1859)(Reviewing evidence of testatrix’s living arrangement with devisee to determine that testatrix intended the term “home” to apply to the mansion on the farm.). Therefore, the particular circumstances of the testator sheds light on the meaning attributed by the testator to words used in a will. Marty v. First Nat’l Bank of Balt., 209 Md. 210, 217 (1956)(Placing itself “in the traditional place, behind the armchair of the testator as he contemplated the disposition he wished to be made to the objects of his bounty.”).
The Court of Special Appeals, in Castruccio v. Estate of Castruccio, 239 Md.App. 345, 196 A.3d 912 (2018) pulled together the various cases admitting extrinsic evidence to illustrate the broad range of the type of evidence admitted under the surrounding circumstance rule. The use of such evidence is not limited by a preliminary finding of ambiguity. It is a rule that enhances the language of a will by putting it in its proper setting.
[1] Miller § 12 (“Surrounding Circumstances; ‘Put Yourself in His Place.'”).
[2]Some Maryland cases fail to appreciate that the surrounding circumstances exception to the plain meaning rule is different than the latent ambiguity exception. For example, the Court of Special Appeals in Click v. Click, 204 Md. 349, seemed to forget the distinction and even confused the two doctrines when it said: “Evidence of a testator’s intent is admissible only once a court determines that a latent ambiguity exists. [Friedman, 412 Md. at 340.] As such, we must first determine whether a latent ambiguity exists in the will before consideration of any surrounding circumstances may be undertaken to discern Joanne’s intent.” Click, 204 Md. at 372 n. 14. Placing its misapplication of the surrounding circumstances rule aside, the Click Court eventually reached the correct result because it mischaracterized a patent ambiguity as a latent ambiguity and then remanded the case to the circuit court to allow extrinsic evidence to be considered, which should have been initially considered by the court anyway under the surrounding circumstances exception.
